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ABSTRACT
Self-regulation has been promoted by the alcohol industry as a sufﬁcient means of regulating alcohol marketing activities.
However, evidence suggests that the guidelines of self-regulated alcohol marketing codes are violated routinely, resulting in
excessive alcohol marketing exposure to youth and the use of content that is potentially harmful to youth and other
vulnerable populations. If the alcohol industry does not adhere to its own regulations the purpose and design of these codes
should be questioned. Indeed, implementation of alcohol marketing self-regulation in Brazil, the United Kingdom and the
United States was likely to delay statutory regulation rather than to promote public health. Moreover, current selfregulation codes suffer from vague language that may allow the industry to circumvent the guidelines, loopholes that
may obstruct the implementation of the codes, lax exposure guidelines that can allow excessive youth exposure, even if
properly followed, and a standard of review that may be inappropriate for protecting vulnerable populations. Greater
public health beneﬁts may be realized if legislative restrictions were applied to alcohol marketing, and strict statutory
alcohol marketing regulations have been implemented and defended successfully in the European Union, with European
courts declaring that restrictions on alcohol marketing are proportional to the beneﬁts to public health. In contrast,
attempts to restrict alcohol marketing activities in the United States have occurred through private litigation and have
been unsuccessful. None the less, repeated violations of industry codes may provide legislators with sufﬁcient justiﬁcation
to pass new legislation and for such legislation to withstand constitutional review in the United States and elsewhere.
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INTRODUCTION
The International Center for Alcohol Policies (ICAP), an
international non-proﬁt organization funded by the alcohol industry [now called the International Alliance for Responsible Drinking (IARD)], has promoted self-regulation
as an effective means of controlling alcohol marketing
practices [1]. Recent reviews have indicated that selfregulated alcohol marketing codes are violated routinely,
alcohol advertisements regularly contain content appealing to vulnerable populations, and youth populations are
exposed to disproportionately large amounts of alcohol
advertising [2,3]. Moreover, the World Health Organization (WHO) has concluded that industry self-regulation
may result in loss of governmental policy control [4].
In contrast to ICAP’s policy agenda, some countries
have implemented and defended statutory alcohol
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marketing regulations successfully. Austria, Belgium,
Finland, France, Germany and Ireland have banned spirits
advertising on television [5]. France’s Loi Évin restricts
alcohol marketers to using only the name of the alcohol
manufacturer, the brand name of the product and related
product characteristics, and prohibits television advertisements for products having an alcohol content of greater
than 2% [6]. The Advertising Act of Ukraine stipulates that
alcohol advertisements appearing on television or radio
can only be broadcast from 11 p.m.–6 a.m. [7]. Thailand’s
Alcoholic Beverage Control Act states that alcohol
advertisements may not directly or indirectly promote
consumption, imply that drinking alcohol is beneﬁcial or
show the product or its packaging [8]. Finland, as of
2015, has banned all Finnish alcohol producers from
advertising on social media [9].
Although ICAP and other industry groups promote
self-regulation, they do not state the purpose and basic
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assumptions underlying the creation of their codes. This
paper uses legal documents and precedents to examine
these questions as well as highlights ﬂaws in current selfregulated alcohol marketing codes, discusses potential
limits on alcohol marketing regulations and identiﬁes
previous litigation against alcohol marketing practices.

Self-regulated alcohol marketing codes: assumptions and
purpose
As currently constructed, self-regulated alcohol marketing
codes contain a number of implicit and explicit assumptions that may reﬂect their purpose. For example, the adoption of marketing codes implies that restrictions on alcohol
marketing are required. The inclusion of exposure restrictions for youth implies that individuals below the legal
purchase age (LPA) should not be exposed to alcohol marketing, and ICAP’s Guiding Principles, which serve as a
‘model’ self-regulatory alcohol marketing code, list
pregnant women explicitly as a vulnerable population requiring protection [1]. We explored these assumptions
and the purpose of the codes by investigating the genesis
of current self-regulated alcohol marketing codes in the
United States, the United Kingdom and Brazil.
United States
Discussions regarding the regulation of alcohol advertising
in the United States began in the 1940s [10], and opponents of government regulation have used the First
Amendment of the US Constitution successfully to assert
commercial free speech rights on the basis that consumers
need truthful information to make reasonable choices
about advertised products (e.g. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island) [11]. The Twenty-First Amendment (granting
states jurisdiction over alcohol beverage commerce) and
the Fifth Amendment (prohibition on discrimination) have
also been utilized as constitutional defenses.
In 1985, before the US House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance, Stephen K. Lambright, the then
Vice-President of Anheuser-Busch stated: ‘Rather than imposing either counter-advertising or a total ban, we would
request that the Congress accept our commitment to vigorous industry self-regulation’ [12]. During the hearing,
Lambright, William O’Shea, President of the Brewer’s
Association of America, and John De Luca, President of
the Wine Association, stated repeatedly that advertising
has no effect on youth while also describing how their
self-regulated alcohol marketing codes protect children.
When legislative hearings were unable to establish a deﬁnitive causal link between advertising and youth alcohol
consumption, self-regulation was advanced as the primary
alternative [13], resulting in the beer, wine and liquor
© 2016 Society for the Study of Addiction

sectors each having unique, self-imposed advertising codes
of conduct.
In 1996, following a liquor advertisement aired by
Seagram, the Distilled Spirits Council of the United States
(DISCUS), the spirits industry’s national trade association,
ended a decades-long voluntary ban on the advertising of
liquor products on television and radio, which had been
in effect since 1936 and 1948 for radio and television,
respectively. The action prompted ﬁerce criticism. Representative Joseph Kennedy II introduced several bills
attempting to restrict alcohol advertising (e.g. the Just
Say No Act and the Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse Prevention Act) [14]; President Bill Clinton called on the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to begin an
investigation into liquor advertisements, and the FCC
Chairman suggested that voluntary restraint was ineffective and a ban on liquor advertisements was needed
[15]. He urged all television and radio stations to ‘just
say no’ to liquor advertising. The FCC inquiry was
expanded to include beer advertisements after the Stroh
Brewery Co. aired an advertisement during a MTV show
targeted at teenage girls [16].
To reassure critics concerned about alcohol abuse and
under-age drinking, DISCUS revised its voluntary Code of
Good Practice in 1996. In place of the television and radio
advertising ban, the revised code listed 26 provisions
aimed at promoting responsible advertising, including
restrictions on the use of cartoon characters popular
among children, although producers could create their
own characters [17]. The Beer Institute implemented a
voluntary marketing code applicable to beer advertisements a year later [16].

United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, the industry-sponsored ‘social
aspect’ organization the Portman Group introduced its
Code of Practice on the Naming, Packaging and Promotion
of Alcohol Drinks (referred to herein as the UK Code) in
April 1996 in response to public and government concern
over alcopops, sweet-ﬂavored alcoholic drinks often packaged in ways appealing to youth [18]. A year later, a survey
of 700 children in seven schools showed that 59% drank
alcopops, prompting the government to order an ‘urgent’
investigation [19]. The ministerial group investigating
alcopops issued a statement demanding ‘swift action’ by
the industry and warned that, if not satisﬁed, the group
was ‘prepared to go further’. ‘It is essential that we protect
our children from being ensnared into the downward spiral
of alcohol abuse and crime’, the statement added [20]. At
the same time, a second edition of the UK Code was
released that included ﬁrmer restrictions on advertisements, including a ban on references to illegal drugs,
linking alcohol with sexual prowess, using actors under
Addiction, 112 (Suppl. 1), 57–63
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the age of 25 years and using artiﬁcially bright colors or
child-like lettering. It also established an independent
review panel [21]. The government steering group created
to investigate the problem did not recommend an outright
ban, in part because of the revamped UK Code. The code
has since been revised ﬁve times, with the latest edition
published in May 2013 [22].

Brazil
Although self-regulation of alcohol marketing predominates, the Brazilian mechanism differs from that used in
the United States and United Kingdom. Instead of being
created by the alcohol industry, self-regulation is deﬁned,
implemented and managed by the advertising industry’s
National Council for Self-Regulation in Advertising
[Conselho Nacional de Autorregulamentacão Publicitária
(CONAR)] and their Code of Self-Regulation in Advertising
(CONAR code), which all industries pledge to follow [23].
In the 1970s, the federal government attempted to promulgate a law that would have required each advertisement to
receive an ‘In Agreement’ stamp before dissemination. The
CONAR code emerged as the industry’s response. The idea
came from the UK model and gained momentum at the
hands of the biggest names in Brazilian advertising. By
1978, during the Third Brazilian Advertising Congress,
CONAR obtained federal recognition of the CONAR code,
convincing regulators to shelve the censorship project and
trust that Brazil’s advertising was mature enough to
self-regulate. Others have concluded that self-regulation in
Brazil has ensured commercial free speech rights and
defended the interests of the advertising industry [24,25].
In 1985, a military dictatorship was replaced by a
democracy. The current federal constitution, enacted in
1988, introduced a series of individual and collective
rights, such as freedom of expression, as a means to limit
possible state abuse. The Constitution also determined that
alcohol advertisements should be regulated by law [26],
which occurred in 1996 [27]. However, the Brazilian
Congress yielded to strong alcohol industry lobbying and
deﬁned alcoholic beverages for advertising purposes as
those with an alcohol concentration greater than 13
degrees of alcohol using the Gay-Lussac method of
measurement, thus effectively eliminating beer and some
wines from regulation. Since then, more than two dozen
bills have been submitted by various parliamentarians
attempting to correct the deﬁnition of alcoholic beverages
for advertising purposes [28]. In our opinion, all have been
unsuccessful due to alcohol industry lobbying efforts,
which includes ﬁnancing parliamentary political
campaigns and donating millions of dollars to politicians
each election cycle. More recently, the Attorney General
of the Republic ﬁled a lawsuit in the Brazilian Supreme
Court seeking to force the National Congress to correct
© 2016 Society for the Study of Addiction
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the concept of alcoholic beverages for advertising purposes
so that it includes those with an alcohol concentration
above 0.5 degrees Gay-Lussac; however, the lawsuit was
ultimately dismissed by the Brazilian Supreme Court [29].
Language, loopholes and gaps
The language used in self-regulated alcohol marketing
codes has been criticized for being vague and open to
multiple interpretations, containing loopholes that undermine the effectiveness of guidelines at protecting vulnerable populations, having lax exposure guidelines and for
the reference point used when determining code compliance [30]. Here, we use ICAP’s Guiding Principles [1],
the US Beer Institute’s Advertising and Marketing Code
[31], Diageo’s Marketing Code [32] and correspondence
received from the US Beer Institute during a complaint
process to highlight what we believe are deﬁciencies.
Vagueness
In ICAP’s Guiding Principles, Section 5: ‘The effects of
alcohol’ contains guidelines that focus on prohibiting the
portrayal of alcohol as enhancing abilities, whether social,
sexual or academic [1]. Guideline 5.3 states, ‘Alcohol beverage marketing communications should not… suggest that
alcohol beverages can enhance physical, sporting, or mental ability’. There are at least two ways to interpret this
guideline. An interpretation favoring the alcohol industry
would be that a direct, explicit, causal link between the
product and enhanced ability needs to be shown in order
for this guideline to be violated. Conversely, an interpretation favoring public health authorities would be that any
association between the product and any type of ability
enhancement should be considered a violation because a
viewer may perceive the association as having a causal
impact on an individual’s abilities and behavior.
Loopholes
In our opinion, the US Beer Institute’s Advertising and
Marketing Code contains a series of loopholes that undermine the impact and reach of the code. First, ‘These guidelines do not apply to educational materials, [or] messages of
a non-brand speciﬁc nature…’ [31]. This implies that corporate social responsibility messages are not covered by
this code, allowing companies to promote their products
indirectly without restriction. The code also states that
the ‘guidelines do not apply to… materials or messages
designed speciﬁcally to address issues of alcohol awareness,
abuse, drunk driving, underage drinking, or overconsumption’, without specifying the extent or type of
anti-drinking statements necessary to meet this requirement [31]. The statement is particularly important due to
the proliferation of ‘responsible drinking’ messages that
appear at the end of television or radio advertisements,
Addiction, 112 (Suppl. 1), 57–63
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and within the ﬁne print of print advertisements. In the
extreme, the industry may consider these messages
sufﬁcient to identify the entire advertisement as addressing
excessive alcohol consumption and the entirety of the Beer
Institute’s code may then no longer apply. Furthermore,
Diageo’s Marketing Code appears to contain a signiﬁcant
loophole stating explicitly that their advertisements may
be appealing to youth [32]. They simply prohibit themselves from creating advertisements that appeal primarily
to this demographic.
Exposure guidelines
ICAP’s Guiding Principles specify that alcohol advertisements should be placed in media only where at least 70%
of the audience consists of legal drinkers [1]. This value
matches the proportion of individuals above the legal
drinking age in the United States according to the 2000
census [33]. The US Beer Institute code uses a standard
of 71.6%, which uses the same value from the 2010
census [31,34]. These cut-offs are used under the premise
that any programming that has an audience with a higher
proportion of adults is unlikely to be attractive to youth, but
there are several issues that these cut-off values do not
consider.
First, the values are not adjusted for those minors who
are highly unlikely to watch adult-oriented programming,
speciﬁcally the under 5-year-old population, which
accounted for 6.8% of the total US population in 2010
[34]. Moreover, advertisement buying guidelines for the industry may only require audience composition data for the
12+ or 18+ population when purchasing advertising
space, excluding 0–11-year-olds or 0–17-year olds from
exposure calculations [35]. Secondly, the lack of a maximum number of underage viewers allowed in an audience
means that high levels of exposure can still occur even
though the audience is well within the industry’s threshold
[36]. Thirdly, cut-off values based on the US population are
not applicable to countries where the LPA is lower or in
countries with different population demographics.
Standard of review
According to the US Beer Institute code, alcohol producers
should use the perspective of a reasonable adult consumer
when making marketing and advertising decisions [31],
but this standard may be inappropriate. The reasonable
adult standard assumes that all advertisements are
perceived by a typical member of the population and disregards the exposure and perceptions of potentially vulnerable subgroups. Youth, for example, are listed explicitly as a
vulnerable population in many codes, yet are expected to
perceive advertisements as reasonable adults. It is plausible
that other vulnerable populations, such as pregnant
women, alcoholics or ethnic minorities, would also
© 2016 Society for the Study of Addiction

perceive alcohol advertisements differently because the
perceptions of risk may not be communicated using culturally appropriate methods for that demographic [37]. The
guidelines also fail to deﬁne who a ‘typical’ person is, which
may or may not be someone with a history of chronic
disease, mental illness or substance abuse.
Statutory alcohol marketing regulations
If statutory regulations on alcohol marketing are enacted,
legal challenges from the alcohol industry are likely to
follow. In the United States, commercial free speech has
been afforded substantial First Amendment protections
since 1975 [38], and regulatory agencies have preferred
to allow the market-place to self-regulate commercial
speech since the 1980s [39]. However, commercial free
speech is not absolute, although any regulation will be subject to the four-part ‘Central Hudson’ test (Table 1) [40]. In
these cases, the government carries the burden of proof,
and courts are instructed to use an intermediate level of
scrutiny, although conservative justices have advocated
using strict scrutiny when truthful information is involved
[41,42]. US experiences are not always transferable to
other countries, however. Indeed, severe restrictions on
alcohol marketing have been implemented and upheld in
other countries. In France, the Loi Évin stipulates a partial
ban on alcohol advertisements with very few exceptions
[7], and the effects of the law extend beyond brand-speciﬁc
advertising [43]. Loi Évin inevitably restricts sports teams
and stadium operators from contracting with alcohol
companies and imposes additional costs on broadcast
transmitters who must remove alcohol references before
sports broadcasts are shown in France. These consequences are felt by entities within and outside of France.
Consequently, the law has been challenged multiple times.
In Bacardi-Martini SAS, Cellier des Dauphins v. Newcastle
United Football Company Ltd, Bacardi challenged the Loi
Évin in the United Kingdom on grounds of interference
with sponsorship contracts and that such interference
was contrary to provisions within the European Community (EC) treaty [44]. EC Courts did not provide a deﬁnitive
ruling on the matter, stating that the UK courts did not
provide sufﬁcient justiﬁcation for how French legislation

Table 1 The four-part ‘Central Hudson’ test.
Question
Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
Part 4

Is the activity unlawful and is the speech false, deceptive
or misleading?
Is the government interest substantial?
Does the regulation of commercial speech directly
advance the state interest?
Is the regulation no more extensive than necessary?
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can inﬂuence their decisions. In Commission of the European
Communities v. French Republic, the court determined that
the Loi Évin was in conﬂict with the freedom to provide
services provision, which is a fundamental right, but that
this right may be limited for the purposes of protecting
public health [45]. Furthermore, the Court expressly
ignored the burden of extra costs imposed on broadcast
transmission companies, choosing only to focus on the
issue of party contracts, and showed deference to national
legislative priorities. This rationale for upholding the Loi
Évin in EC Courts provides a precedent for the expansion
of strict, statutory regulations on alcohol marketing practices in EU member states. However, the Courts’ deference
to national priorities can also provide an avenue for EU
regulations to be overturned which, for example, occurred
in Sweden [46].
Legal challenges against alcohol producers
In the United States, a handful of lawsuits against alcohol
producers have been ﬁled seeking monetary or injunctive relief. These suits have met with little success. In Guglielmi v.
Anheuser-Busch, Guglielmi sought a permanent injunction
against Anheuser-Busch to modify their advertising practices
[47]. The lawsuit was dismissed by the courts with prejudice.
In Kreft v. Adolph Coors, a complaint alleging damages due to
alcohol advertisements encouraging underage children to
consume alcoholic beverages was dismissed because no
injury to the plaintiffs was shown; the court awarded the
defendants attorney fees [48]. Complaints against Zima,
Anheuser-Busch and Coors have also been dismissed for
either lack of standing or failure to show injury [49–52].
Guglielmi may have provided a basis for future public health
litigation, however. Guglielmi stated that the lawsuit was in
the ‘public interest’ yet no public agencies joined as plaintiffs,
implying that state or federal agencies are required for litigation to proceed [47].

Shifting away from self-regulation
The presumption of self-regulated alcohol marketing codes
is that subpopulations exist that are considered particularly
vulnerable to alcohol marketing practices, and these populations should not be exposed to or be targeted by alcohol
marketing. However, because youth exposure to alcohol
marketing in countries where self-regulation predominates
continues to be high and alcohol producers appear to
violate the content guidelines of self-regulated alcohol
marketing codes routinely [2], a plausible alternative
explanation for the continued promotion of self-regulation
by the alcohol industry is to delay statutory regulation, as
suggested by the experiences in the United States, United
Kingdom and Brazil. Indeed, we were unable to ﬁnd documentation that alcohol producers stated explicitly that a
© 2016 Society for the Study of Addiction
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marketing code was being implemented to protect youth
or other vulnerable populations.
Interestingly, self-regulation has worked for some industries. The forestry industry established the Forest
Stewardship Council to promote responsible management of forests when governments failed to do so, and
the ﬁshing industry established the Marine Stewardship
Council to protect global ﬁsh stocks [53]. These selfregulatory measures were adopted successfully because
the industries determined that there was economic beneﬁt from following voluntary guidelines. In contrast,
self-regulated marketing codes implemented in the tobacco and breast milk substitute industries failed
[53,54], leading ultimately to strict statutory legislation
at the national and international levels [55,56]. Here, effective and enforced voluntary restrictions may have
been seen as economically detrimental.
Repeated, blatant violations of self-regulated alcohol
marketing codes can provide government regulators with
an opportunity to use current laws to restrict marketing
practices and provided legislators with a justiﬁcation for
passage of new laws, and ‘legal scholars recognize that
the failure of ethical norms to deter behavior that is widely
regarded as unacceptable is a classic trigger for the imposition of legal norms’ [57]. More bluntly, the alcohol industry
invites direct legal regulation by ignoring the need for
better adherence to the industry’s own stated controls.
A number of countries have already imposed statutory
restrictions on marketing activities, and in the European
Union these restrictions have withstood legal challenges
from the alcohol industry. However, any new restrictions
will probably be met with additional legal challenges. Although tough marketing restrictions among EU member
states may not violate EU treaties, legislation must still \surrvive country-speciﬁc constitutional review. In the United
States, the environment for passage of alcohol marketing
restrictions is difﬁcult. Alcohol regulations must be deﬁned
narrowly and tailored to address speciﬁc issues among speciﬁc populations. Moreover, any attempts at using the litigation process to restrict alcohol marketing activities will
require public agencies at the local, state or federal levels
to be plaintiffs in order for any such lawsuit to proceed.
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